In this paper, we adapt the logit qualitative-choice model for use in private-value, asymmetric, second-price auctions. The same properties that have made the logit such an attractive model in qualitativechoice settings, its analytic and numeric tractability and its ease-ofestimation, carry over to auction settings. We develop several different estimators to recover the bidders' joint v alue distribution from either aggregate or individual auction data. The model is well-suited to the problem of merger prediction where economists must work with available data under time constraints imposed by the merger statutes. From moment restrictions on winning bids and winning probabilities, we derive a Her ndahl-like formula to predict the e ects of mergers.
Introduction
In a private-values Vickrey 25 auction, the price, or winning bid, is determined by the value of the second-place bidder. A merger, or bidding coalition, has the potential to change the identity of the second-place bidder, and thus change the winning price. This occurs only when the merged coalition includes both the winning bidder and the second-place bidder. The frequency of this event and the magnitude of the resulting price change determine the expected merger e ect.
Since the expected merger e ect is obviously dependent on the characteristics of the bidders' joint v alue distribution, estimation of the value distribution is a crucial step in analyzing the competitive e ects of mergers. This paper is motivated by the problems of merger prediction and estimation of the value distribution from observed bidding data.
To study mergers, we need an asymmetric model because, even if bidders are symmetric before the merger, after the merger they are not. In such asymmetric auctions, expected prices and winning probabilities are characterized by m ulti-dimensional integrals. The di culty o f w orking with these integrals has made it di cult for economists to develop structural estimators of asymmetric auctions for Bayesian approach see Bajari 2 . The problem is analogous to the econometric problem of estimating choice probabilities in random-utility models e.g. Geweke 14 . The analogy to random-utility models suggests also suggests adapting the logit model, with its tractable closed-form expressions, for use in second-price auctions.
Though restrictive Hausman and McFadden 16 , the logit qualitativechoice model has a number of desirable properties.
Its analytic tractability makes it an attractive theoretical benchmark. The logit model has facilitated analysis of di erentiated-products oligopoly in general Anderson, DePalma and Thisse 1 , and mergers in particular Willig 29 and Werden and Froeb 27 . The closed-form expressions facilitate estimation with either grouped or individual data e:g: Train 22 . The logit model can be generalized by adding nests" McFadden 20 or mixing" terms to accomodate consumer heterogeneity Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 6 ; Brownstone and Train 8 .
In this paper, we show that the rst two of these properties carry over to the logit auction model. In particular we derive closed-form expressions for the winning probabilities and winning bids in a second-price auction. We conjecture that these closed form expressions can be modi ed to accomodate nests or mixing terms.
A Logit Second-Price Auction Model
Without loss of generality, w e assume a selling auction where the highvalue rm outbids all the other rms, and where price is set by the secondhighest value. We make the assumption that rms' values are the sum of two independent components: an idiosyncratic component, X i , and a common component with mean zero and nite variance, Y . The common component is added to account for between-auction heterogeneity. T h us we let
where V i is the value drawn by the i-th bidder, X i is an independent extremevalue process with parameters i ; , and Y is an independent random variable with mean zero and variance 2 .
The common component, Y , is normalized to have mean zero by adjusting the means of the idiosyncratic components. We assume that the common component is common knowledge; and in much of what follows we ignore the common component because it does not change the winner of the auction or the expected winning bid. It does, however, mask variation in X i which makes it di cult for estimators to recover the idiosyncratic variance.
The extreme-value distribution, also known as the Gumbel or Type III extreme-value, has the probability density function f = e , , e ,e , , 
The distribution is characterized by location and spread parameters, ;, which are related to its rst two moments as follows EX = + 2.4 V a r X = 2 6 2 2.5
The symbol denotes Euler's constant 0:57721. The extreme-value distribution is preserved over linear transformations, i:e:, i f X is distributed as an extreme-value with parameters ; then X , is distributed as an extreme-value with parameters 0; 1. The usefulness of the extreme-value distribution for modeling auctions is derived from its closure under the maximum function. If bidders are drawing from independent extreme-value distributions with the same variance, but di erent means, then the maximum of their values has an extreme-value distribution with the same variance, but a higher mean. The maximum function is used to compute the winning probabilities the probability that a bidder will have a v alue higher than the maximum of rivals' values and prices the maximum of rivals' values, and to compute the e ects of a merger the merged rm has a value equal to the maximum of coalition member values. The following proposition states a well-known property of independent extreme-value distributed variates see e.g. Ben-Akiva and Lerman 5 . The next proposition is a standard result for models using the extremevalue distribution. It provides a formula for the probability that bidder i wins the auction. Proposition 2. Let X i = maxfX j : 1 j n; j 6 = ig, and let p i be the expected share of bidder i, i:e:, the probability that X i X i . Then p i Pr o bX i X i = e i e max = e i P n j=1 e j :
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To establish this proposition, we rst prove a lemma that is used in the proofs of this and a following proposition.
Lemma 1. The probability that X i is the highest value X max , given that X max is less than t, is independent of t, and has value Pr o bX i X i jX max t = e i e max :
Proof. See Appendix. Proposition 2 is an immediate consequence of Lemma 1 by taking the limit as t ! 1 . Note that the probability that bidder i has the maximum value is independent of the value of the maximum. This property simpli es derivation of the probability of observing a particular ordering among the top bidders. The formula above can be extended in a straightforward manner to derive the probability of observing any ordering among the top r of n bidders where r n.
Next we examine the distribution of winning bids for each auction participant. The general formulas for order statistics drawn from heterogeneous distributions can be found in Section 2.8 of David 10 . What di erentiates our approach from the development in 10 is that we compute order statistics for the second-highest value, conditional on the identity of the high-value bidder. By conditioning on the identity of the bidders, we are implicitly assuming that the researcher has data on bidder identities. Proposition 4. Let A i be the highest value of the X j 's conditional on bidder i b eing the winning bidder, i:e:, A i is X i conditional on X i X i . Then A i is distributed identically to X max the same for any i. Let B i be the secondhighest value of the X i 's conditional on bidder i being the winning bidder, i:e:, B i is X i conditional on X i X i . In Equation 2.9, the expected price is decreasing in the expected share because a high-mean-value rm doesn't bid against itself, making it more likely that it will win at a lower price than a low-mean-value rm.
It is interesting to note the parallels of this auction model to other asymmetric oligopoly models. They typically exhibit positive margin share relationships, similar to Equation 2.9. In the asymmetric Cournot model, the margin share relationship is implied by the Nash rst-order conditions price , mc i price = share i
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where is the price elasticity of demand. In the Bertrand model, the Nash rst-order conditions are written in terms of a margin elasticity relationship price i , mc i price i
Usually, elasticity i s i n versely related to share large shares are associated with lower elasticities, as in the logit di erentiated products model e.g. Werden and Froeb 27 . A negative elasticity share relation implies a positive margin share relationship. Note that these relationships rule out the existence of high-volume, low-margin rms in Nash equilibrium.
Estimating the Value Distribution
Auctions are typically used to sell or purchase unique items. Because of this, auction data are characterized by a considerable degree of hetereogeneity across items. We h a ve modeled this hetereogeneity b y adding a common observed component, Y , to each bidder's value. This common component masks variation in winning bids due to the idiosyncratic component and implies that estimators based only on the winning bids will have a di cult time distinguishing within from between-auction variance. This leads us to consideration of a within-auction estimator, based on di erences between losing bids. In what follows, we assume the existence of data on bidder identities, bidder characteristics including losing bidder characteristics, and winning bids across a sample of auctions. We treat each auction as an independent event, but recognize that this assumption may not be appropriate in the presence of collusion, as in a bid-rotation scheme, or with bidder capacity constraints.
Individual Data: Winning Bids
In this section, we construct a two-step methods-of-moments estimator of the value distribution using data on winning bids and bidder characteristics for a set of auctions. In the rst step, winning bidders are predicted" as a function of observable bidder characteristics using a maximum-likelihood logit estimator. The logarithm of the likelihood function is constructed from the probability of winning among T bidders as
log e it P nt k=1 e kt 3.1 the variable i is taken as a function of t that gives the winning bidder in the t-th auction, i:e: p it is the probability that the t-th auction is won by bidder i. The estimated location parameters, it , are the tted values from the logit estimation. We note that the estimated location parameters are observationally equivalent to parameters scaled by a linear transformation, i:e: the logit probabilities for an extreme value it ; 1 are identical to those for an extreme value it + c=; . data grouped by bidder, are available. With aggregate data on prices average winning bids and shares how frequently bidders' win, it is possible to use the same two-step estimator as above. However, with aggregate data it is also possible to use a maximum-likelihood estimator by treating the aggregate prices as means and applying the central limit theorem. Let p i and b i denote the share and average winning bid for bidder i across a sample of T auctions. The joint density of the share and the winning bid can be factored i:e:, f b i ; p i = f p i f b i j p i , so that log-likelihood is the sum of two components. The rst component is the logit log-likelihood, and the second component is the log-likelihood for a normal distribution, 
Individual Data: Within-Auction Estimators
Estimators based only on winning bids have t wo problems. First, they have di culty distinguishing a large idiosyncratic variance small , from a large common variance large . The di culty can be understood by examining the method-of-moments estimator. The variance parameter is estimated from the slope of the price share relationship. Large price variance, due either to common or idiosyncratic shocks, is analogous to a large residual variance, which reduces the precision of the slope estimator. The second problem is that bidder participation in the auction may be correlated with an unobservable to the econometrician element of the common shock, Y . This leads to simultaneous equations bias caused by the endogeneity of the bidder pool. This is analogous to the endogeneity o f concentration in a price concentration regression Evans, Froeb, and Werden 12 . We address both concerns with within-auction estimators based on the di erence between losing bids. Di erencing the bids eliminates the nuisance variable Y .
Second-price Auctions
In a Vickrey 25 or second-price auction, the highest bidder pays a price equal to the second-highest bid. Because the winning bidder's price is not dependent on his bid, it is a dominant strategy for each bidder to bid his true value. A maximum-likelihood estimator can be constructed from the distribution of the di erence between the highest and second-highest bids. Note that this is also the surplus or pro t margin to the winning bidder. Expressing the likelihood in terms of the p 0 i s instead of the 0 i s suggests a t wo-step limited-information maximum-likelihood estimator analogous to the two-step method-of-moments estimator above. In the rst step, logit probabilites are estimated with a maximimum-likelihood routine as in Equation 3.1. The tted probabilites are used to construct the likelihood based on f i t, the density corresponding to the distribution F i t of Proposition 5. The parameter is recovered in the second-stage estimation. The corresponding full-information maximum-likelihood estimator can be estimated using starting values obtained from the limited-information estimator. In our experience, convergence is more likely if the likelihood is parameterized in terms of 1= rather than .
Open Auctions
For certain open auctions, it is possible to observe losing bids. For example, in government procurement, losing oral bids are recorded e:g: Brannman and Froeb 7 . Depending on the precise bidding mechanism, the di erence between the second and third-highest bids can be taken as the di erence between the second and third-highest values because it is a dominant strategy for losing bidders to bid up to their values. In contrast, the di erence between the two highest bids is not informative about the distribution because the winner is trying only to outbid the second highest-value bidder. Information about the di erences between lower-ranked bids may be less informative for the same reasons that information about lower-ranked surveyed alternatives is less precise Hausman and Ruud 17 . 4 Predicting Merger Price E ects U.S. antitrust law prohibits mergers that substantially lessen competition. Once consummated, mergers are very costly to undo, so predictions about merger e ects must be made prior to consummation. These predictions are made in an adversarial setting, and under the time constraints mandated the merger statutes. 1 To be useful for policy, merger predictors must be objective and tractable" Sherwin 21 and exible enough to be used with available data.
Currently, the courts and enforcement agencies use structural" predictors to evaluate proposed mergers. Markets are delineated, shares are assigned, and the legality of a merger turns largely on the size of the merging rms' shares. Structural predictors do not perform well because they are not based on economic models of oligopoly, on empirical studies of mergers, or on empirical studies of the structure performance relationship Werden and Froeb 28 . In this section, we propose an alternative to structural merger analysis by applying the logit auction model to the problem of predicting merger price e ects.
Although mergers are typically very complex transactions, their direct anticompetitive e ect in the private-value auction setting can be modeled by assuming that the merged entity generates values equal to the maximum of the pre-merger individual values. Like mergers among producers of di erentiated products Davidson and Deneckere 11 , such mergers are always pro table Mailith and Zemsky 18 because the merged entity has the same stand-alone value as its coalition members, and it eliminates competition among them. This merger characterization has been used by the antitrust enforcement agencies to model the price e ects of mergers in various auction settings, including mining equipment and hospitals Baker 3 . In the logit auction model, Equation 2.9 can be used to compute expected pro ts for each bidder, the surplus of value over winning bid for the fraction of auctions expected to be won. The expected pro t to bidder i is thus measured by EX max , EB i p i = ,1= log 1 , p i :
Let hx = , log1 , x so that the pro t for bidder i is hp i =. Then the total pro t to all bidders is
The expression for H is analogous to a Her ndahl index, and can be used to compute the expected change in industry pro ts following a merger between rms i and j. The share of the merged rm is p i + p j since the merged rm 1 Section 7A Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 18a.
wins in every auction where one or the other of the original rms would have won. The shares of the other rms remain unchanged. Since the auction is e cient, the extra pro t to rms i and j is equal to the reduction in revenue at auction, and is given by H = Revenue = hp i + p j , hp i , hp j ;
4.3 a simple function of the shares of the merging rms scaled by the spread parameter. The logit auction model can also be used to construct a consumer-welfare benchmark, against which the e ciency claims of the merging parties can be evaluated. Although mergers do not a ect the e ciency properties of second-price auctions, they do harm consumers i:e:, the auctioneer by reducing the winning bids of the merging rms. Merger synergies can o set this harm by making the merged rm a stronger bidder. This forces the nonmerging rms to bid higher in order to win. In this way, mergers can raise prices paid by non-merging rms just as they lower prices paid by merging rms. The increase in value reduction in the marginal costs of the merged rm that keeps industry price constant can be numerically computed by equating pre and post-merger expected price.
For large mergers, such compensating marginal cost reductions may not exist. Once the merging rm reaches a certain size, no amount of marginal cost reduction can o set the merger price increase because marginal cost reductions increase price only in auctions that the merging rms do not win. If the merging rms are already winning most of the auctions, then making them stronger cannot o set the merger price e ects.
Discussion
In the model, we nd that the e ects of mergers are critically dependent on the variance of the bidders' joint v alue distribution. Depending on the variance, a highly concentrated industry structure could be consistent with grossly di erent price e ects, at least some of which w ould not be considered anticompetitive or vice-versa. A similar nding, that the e ects of merger are critically dependent on the structure of demand Hausman, Leonard, and Zona 15 ; Werden and Froeb 27 has lead to criticism of structural merger policy in di erentiated products industries. We h a ve shown that the same criticism applies to structural merger policy in auction markets.
Estimating the bidders' joint v alue distribution is just as important for evaluating mergers in auction markets as estimating demand is for evaluating mergers in di erentiated products industries. where F max is the cumulative distribution function of X max . In the numerator, when X i X i , w e h a ve X max = X i , and hence, X i 2 t; t + t and X i is bounded above b y a n umber between t and t + t. A s t ! 0, the probability that X i t + t approaches the probability that X i t .
Hence, we h a ve the approximation for t 1, since F i tF i t = F max t. But this limit is independent o f t, and hence, the probability that X i is largest, given that X max lies in any su ciently small interval is close to the same constant v alue. We conclude that the probability is equal to this constant o n a n y i n terval and so Pr o bX i X i jX max t = e i =e max is independent o f t.
Proposition 4 Let A i be the highest value of the X's conditional on bidder i being the winning bidder, i:e:, A i is X i conditional on X i X i . Then A i is distributed identically to X max the same for any i. Let B i be the second-highest value of the X's conditional on bidder i being the winning bidder, i:e:, B i is X i conditional on X i X i . Then the cumulative distribution function of B i is F B i t = 
